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Abstract: Prices for emission allowances in Europe’s Emissions Trading System (ETS) have 
remained low for many years. This fact has given rise to controversies on whether there is a 
need for a fundamental reform of the ETS. Potential reform proposals include the introduction 
of a price floor for certificates and a market stability reserve (MSR), which is a rule-based 
mechanism to steering the market volume of allowances and the preferred approach of the 
European Commission. With the introduction of the MRS, the Commission aims at increasing 
and stabilizing certificate prices in the medium- and long-term. In this article, we alternatively 
recommend retaining the ETS as it is, rather than supplementing it by introducing a minimum 
price floor or a market stability reserve. Instead, mistakes from the past should be corrected 
by a single intervention: the final elimination of those 900 million allowances that were taken 
out of the market in 2014, but would again emerge in the market in 2019 and 2020 via 
backloading. 
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The global number of emissions trading systems steadily increases. Ten years after launching 
the emissions trading scheme in the European Union (EU) in 2005, the International Carbon 
Action Partnership (ICAP, 2015) currently counts 17 such systems on four continents.1 These 
regions account for 40% of the global Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Just recently, at the 
beginning of 2015, South Korea implemented a nation-wide ETS, while China foresees the 
introduction of a nation-wide system for 2016.  
The European Emissions Trading System (ETS) is the central instrument to reduce 
Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions in Europe. About 45% of the EU-wide GHG emissions are 
covered by this scheme (EC, 2013). With the help of the ETS, the European Commission 
aims at reducing carbon dioxide (ܥܱଶ) emissions by 20% until 2020 and by 30% until 2030 
relative to the 1990 level. To this end, the EU-wide maximum of emissions covered by the 
ETS, the so-called cap, is annually reduced by 1.74% between 2013 and 2020 (EP, 2010); 
from 2021 onwards the cap shall be decreased by 2.2% per year (CEU, 2014).  
Compared to the price peak of about 30€ that was reached in April 2006, allowance 
prices have remained low for years, ranging between 3 and 9€ in the period from January 
2012 to January 2015 (Figure 1). This fact sparked controversial discussions about this 
climate protection instrument. Some argue that the design of the ETS is not effective in 
mitigating climate change when allowance prices are low, and therefore needs reforming. 
These low prices are the consequence of large amounts of excess allowances. In fact, the 
number of excess allowances amounted to two billion at the beginning of the third trading 
phase in 2013 (EC, 2015). This surplus arose from the large difference between allocated 
allowances (supply) and verified emissions (demand). Hence, in 2014 the European 
Commission (EC, 2014a) resolved to intervene into the operation of the ETS and postponed 
the auction of 900 Million allowances from 2014-2016 to 2019 and 2020, a process referred 
to as backloading.  
Since this intervention only temporarily limits the supply of allowances, but does not 
solve the structural problem of both excess allowances and low prices, the European 
Commission recently decided to introduce a so-called market stability reserve (MRS), with its 
                                                            
1 Apart from the European Emissions Trading System, there are 16 trading schemes that are implemented in the 
following countries: Canada (Québec Cap-and-Trade System), China (Beijing, Chongqing, Guandong, Hubei, 
Shanghai, Shenzhen and Tianj), Japan (Saitama Target Setting Emissions Trading System and Tokyo Cap-and-
Trade Program), Kazakhstan (KAZ ETS), Korea (Korea Trading Scheme), New Zealand (NZ ETS), Switzerland 
(Swiss ETS), USA (California Cap-and-Trade Program and RGGI) (ICAP, 2015). 
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introduction being foreseen for 2019. The core of the MRS is a rule-based mechanism that 
automatically steers the amount of circulating allowances by withdrawing and storing them in 
a reserve when the number of excess allowances exceeds an upper limit. Conversely, 
allowances are returned to the market when the number of excess allowances falls below a 
lower limit. With the help of the MSR, the Commission hopes to stabilize allowance prices on 
a higher level than currently observed.  
Figure 1: Allowance Prices in the European Emissions Trading System (January 2012-January 2015) 
 
Source: EEX (2015) 
Alternative reform proposals include the implementation of price floors, which is 
supported by the German Advisory Council on the Environment (SRU, 2011:255), and a price 
corridor for allowances (Fell and Morgenstern, 2010; Wood and Jotzo, 2011). Specifically, 
limiting the price volatility at the lower end is expected to lead to a minimum level of security 
for investments in abatement technologies (acatech et al., 2015:19; Grüll and Taschini, 2011). 
Based on a theoretical discussion on the relative merits of alternative reform 
proposals, this article recommends retaining the ETS as it is, rather than supplementing it by 
introducing a minimum price floor or a market stability reserve. With respect to the market 
stability reserve, we argue that this instrument is not sufficient to increase allowance prices 
markedly in the short run. Although price floors and corridors are frequently asserted to be 
more effective alternatives, we demonstrate why the implementation of these instruments is 
not desirable either. 
In the subsequent section, we describe the basic principles of the ETS, as well as the 
key reasons for the large number of excess allowances, which ultimately led to the 
controversial debate about this climate protection instrument. Section 3 presents the concept 



















surplus of allowances. Section 4 theoretically discusses whether price- or quantity-based 
instruments are preferable when there is incomplete information and decisions must be made 
under uncertainty – as it is inevitably the case in reality. The final section suggests an 
alternative reform of the ETS.  
2. Reasons for the Surplus of Allowances 
According to economic theory, certificate trading is a cost-efficient instrument to achieve a 
fixed environmental target in the short run (Baumol and Oates, 1988; Bonus, 1998). Among 
other reasons, this is why the Commission established the ETS as a central instrument to 
impel climate protection in Europe. Along with the primary target of reducing GHG 
emissions cost-efficiently, by means of pricing emissions, the ETS is supposed to provide 
incentives to invest in low-carbon technologies. 
Holding allowances entitles those companies covered by the ETS to emit the 
respective number of tons of ܥܱଶ or its equivalent of other greenhouse gases.2 In the 
meantime, there is a liquid trade in allowances at the stock market, so that it is warranted to 
regard stock prices as the reference price for bilateral trades. At the end of each year, 
participating companies have to hold at least that amount of allowances that equals its actual 
emissions; otherwise, fines are imposed. In 2013, the fine for each lacking certificate 
amounted to 100€, but this level is adjusted yearly, taking the inflation rate into account (EC, 
2013). The fine does not absolve from the obligation to purchase the remaining allowances. 
Since these have to be procured despite settling the fine, the fine does not imply an upper 
price limit for allowances, as is sometimes erroneously claimed.  
Companies base their climate protection effort on the market price for allowances: if 
the price exceeds their individual marginal abatement costs, companies will invest in 
technologies with lower emissions. Conversely, if the allowance price is below their marginal 
abatement costs, companies will forego investments in more efficient technologies and 
instead purchase allowances. In the past years, the allowance price ranged between 6 and 9€. 
This relatively low price is mainly attributed to a huge surplus of allowances in the market. A 
surplus emerges if the cumulated number of allowances exceeds the (verified) actual 
emissions.  
                                                            
2 In the following, although solely speaking of ܥܱଶ for brevity, we, in fact, refer to ܥܱଶ-equivalents, as along 
with ܥܱଶ, the ETS comprises Nitrous Oxide ( ଶܱܰ) and Perfluorocarbons (PFC). 
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There are manifold reasons for the huge surplus of excess allowances: One reason is 
the unexpected low emission level as a consequence of the longstanding and severe economic 
crisis that erupted in 2008. Most notably, Southern European countries have been strongly 
afflicted by the crisis and have not yet recovered economically. Another reason is the 
generation of green electricity in Europe. Both the Commission and individual Member States 
defined targets for the shares of green electricity in consumption and established promotion 
schemes that overlap with the ETS. In Germany, for instance, the generation of ܥܱଶ-free 
electricity, which is promoted by fixed feed-in-tariffs for renewable energy sources (RES), 
leads to a decreased demand for emission allowances in the German power sector 
(characterized in Figure 2 by a shift of the demand curve from ܦ଴ to ܦଵ).  
Consequently, the allowance price drops from ݌଴ to ݌ଵ, so that market participants of 
other sectors and countries can purchase allowances at lower prices. For instance, in their 
empirical analysis, Koch et al. (2014:681) find certificate price elasticity estimates of wind 
and solar electricity production falling between -0.11 and -0.15. As a result, more ܥܱଶ will be 
emitted outside the German power sector than without promoting RES in Germany, as 
companies refrain from investing in abatement technologies due to reduced allowance prices. 
In effect, owing to the coexistence with the ETS, the promotion of RES does not reduce 
emissions, but rather leads to a shift in emissions within the EU (BMWA, 2004). The same 
argument holds for other abatement measures that affect the sectors covered by the ETS, such 
as energy efficiency policies and the national ܥܱଶ tax in the United Kingdom.  
Admittedly, the Commission was quite successful in anticipating the emissions-
reducing effect of green electricity promotion and in taking it into account for setting the 
emissions cap for 2020. The massive deployment of RES in some countries, however, 
particularly in Germany (Frondel et al., 2015), could not have been foreseen. In the end, the 
total amount of green electricity produced in the EU exceeded the amount that entered the 
calculations for the emissions cap – causing downward pressure on allowance prices (Agora 
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between 2008 and 2020; this is equivalent to 1.6 billion allowances.3 Since 2013, neither 
reforestation projects, nor the combustion of Perfluorocarbons (PFC) and the destruction of 
Nitrous oxide ( ଶܱܰ) are remunerated through ERUs anymore.4 
Yet, the offsets resulting from already approved projects can still be used in the ETS, 
because it is allowed to transfer excess allowances from the second to the third trading phase 
(banking). Therefore, the Öko-Institut (2013), as well as Neuhoff and Schopp (2013), ascribe 
the major part of the two billion excess allowances observed at the beginning of the third 
trading phase to the huge number of available CERs and ERUs. According to the Öko-Institut 
(2013), these offsets are responsible for 1.5 billion excess allowances; the remaining surplus 
may be attributed to the aftermath of the economic crisis in the late 2010s. 
3. The Market Stability Reserve (MSR) 
According to critics, the massive surplus of allowances and the resulting lack of scarcity 
signals do not lead to sufficient investments in carbon-extensive technologies. To spur 
investment incentives, several reform proposals have been suggested, among others the 
introduction of a market stability reserve (EC, 2014b), on which the EU institutions 
(Commission, Council, and Parliament) are expected to decide upon in 2015. This rule-based 
mechanism automatically steers the annual amount of allowances to be auctioned.  
With the MSR, the Commission pursues two main objectives: first, reducing the high 
amount of excess allowances in the short term and, second, stabilizing allowance prices in the 
long term. To this end, an independent institution is supposed to determine the accumulated 
amount of allowances once a year. If at the end of year t the number of allowances exceeds 
the upper limit (833 million according to the EC proposal), the volume of auctioned 
allowances will be reduced by 12%, but at least by 100 million, in January of year t+2 and 
will be transferred to the reserve (Figure 3). Thus, this mechanism could prove effective only 
with a time lag of up to one year.5 If, on the other hand, the accumulated surplus is below the 
                                                            
3 According to the EU Linking Directive, Germany may use up to 22% of the allowances resulting from 
international projects. Thus, during the third trading phase, German operators can acquire about 450 million 
offsets arising from realizing CDM and JI measures.  
4 The major part (58%) of the CERs used in the ETS originates from PFC projects (abatement costs: about 50 
ct/t ܥܱଶ), while another 24% originates from similar ଶܱܰ projects (abatement costs about 1 EUR/t ܥܱଶ) (Agora 
Energiewende, 2015). The climatic impact of both PFC and ଶܱܰ is by far much higher than that of ܥܱଶ, but they 
can be destructed at very low costs. While this procedure is legally prescribed in developed countries, the 
destruction was realized in CDM measures in China, India, South Korea and Mexico, to name but a few 
developing countries. Therefore, the resulting, inexpensive allowances are controversially discussed.  
























































ces to the 
f the MSR  
the specifi
h respect t




































































































al of the 
 will be 
















based instruments, as well as combinations thereof, thereby accounting for the fact that, in 
reality, decisions have to be made under uncertainty.  
Figure 4: Potential Evolution of Excess Allowances and the MSR according to the Proposal of the Commission 
Source: Agora Energiewende (2015) 
4. Quantity- versus Price-Based Instruments 
The debate on whether emissions should be abated by either price-based interventions (e.g. 
taxes) or quantity-based instruments (e.g. trading schemes) has been going on for decades. 
Martin Weitzman (1974) formalized this discussion in his seminal paper “Prices vs. 
Quantities”. According to the so-called Weitzman-Theorem, under perfect information, price 
and quantity-based instruments yield the same optimum of emission abatement, regardless of 
whether the price or the quantity is fixed. Indeed, if the shapes of the marginal benefit curve 
(ܯܤ) and marginal cost curve (ܯܥ௔) were to be known, either the emissions cap ܧ∗ or the tax 
rate ݐ∗ could be set (Figure 5) and both alternatives would provide the same optimal price-
quantity combination.   
Yet, if the shapes of ܯܤ and ܯܥ௔ are unknown – as it is the case in reality – price- 
and quantity-based instruments generally yield divergent outcomes. If emission caps and tax 
rates are set on the basis of expected marginal costs, ܯܥ௘, rather than the actual marginal cost 
curve, ܯܥ௔, the comparative advantage of either instrument, as well as the corresponding 
welfare losses, depend on the slopes of the curves at their intersection. This is the central 
insight of the Weitzman-Theorem.  
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reductions over several decades. The reason for this claim is that limiting emissions would be 
particularly important if the world was to be close to a tipping point whose crossing increases 
the likelihood of a climatic catastrophe (Hepburn, 2006:232). Crossing the tipping point 
becomes more likely as the time horizon of the climate protection agreement increases 
(Hepburn, 2006:238).  
The high degree of uncertainty with respect to the shapes of the marginal cost and 
benefit curves gives also rise to combining both price and quantity based approaches into so-
called hybrid instruments, such as a trading system with a floor for certificate prices. Price 
floors would only prove effective in cases of low demand, as in such situations, the price floor 
prevents market prices from falling below a lower bound (Figure 6). Then, a price floor works 
like a tax whose rate equals the difference between the price floor and the hypothetical market 
price that would be observed in the absence of the price floor. In situations in which the price 
floor is binding, companies would invest in additional abatement measures, rather than 
purchasing more expensive allowances, leading to an excess supply (ܥܽ݌ െ ܧ஺) of allowances 
(Figure 6).Then, an independent institution, e.g. a so-called European Allowance Bank, would 
have to buy the excess supply (ܥܽ݌ െ ܧ஺) to stabilize the trading scheme. In essence, a price 
floor thus causes a reduction of the emissions cap, something that could also be achieved by 
other measures, however, such as the permanent deletion of excess allowances. 
Another hybrid instrument with which the uncertainty about allowance prices among 
market participants could be reduced is a price corridor (Koch et al., 2014:678). A key 
property of price corridors is the definition of a ceiling price, which becomes relevant in 
situations characterized by high demand and high scarcity (demand curve ܦ in Figure 7). In 
such situations, as the allowance price cannot exceed the ceiling price, companies would not 
invest in additional abatement measures when the ceiling price is reached, but instead would 
purchase allowances. Because the originally fixed supply cannot meet demand, more 
allowances must be made available, e.g. by a European Allowance Bank. As a consequence, 
the definition of a ceiling price in trading schemes is equivalent to raising the emissions cap. 
The tighter the price corridor in the trading scheme is defined, that is, the smaller the 
difference between the ceiling price and the price floor, the more it resembles a tax. 
Conversely, a trading scheme with a price corridor resembles a pure trading system if the 
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In contrast, a price floor has the disadvantage that it increases the cost burden for 
companies during recessive periods, while the ceiling of a price corridor limits the dampening 
effect of high allowance prices in boom cycles. Another disadvantage of a price floor is that 
this instrument can be abused by politicians in order to generate revenues. In fact, it is 
precisely the desire for higher revenues that could result in a steady increase of the price floor. 
This worry is all the more warranted, as the “appropriate” price for emissions is unknown and, 
hence, there is no natural upper limit for political interventions with respect to the price floor.  
Similarly, the MSR may also be prone to political interventions that aim at raising its 
lower and upper limits to impact allowances prices and generate revenues. The resulting 
uncertainties from such discretionary interventions may negatively affect both the innovation 
behavior of firms and their GHG emission levels. In sum, as a general rule, it must be 
recognized that any intervention into the mechanism of the ETS entails uncertainties, most 
importantly about the future amount of allowances, which may have negative consequences 
for investments in emission abatement technologies. 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
Prices for emission allowances were notoriously low in recent years. This fact is frequently 
interpreted as a symptom of an insufficient functioning of the European Emissions Trading 
System (ETS) and used as a justification for the necessity of reforming it. This argument, 
however, is questionable, as a low allowance price is not a sign that the trading scheme works 
imperfectly (Keohane, Wagner, 2013). Rather, low prices may indicate that either the 
emissions cap has not been ambitiously enough (e.g. as the result of a sluggish economy) or 
that the abatement costs have turned out to be lower than expected.  
Actually, both reasons apply to the past, so that at the end of 2013, the surplus 
allowances in the ETS amounted to more than 2.2 billion (Gibis et al., 2015:26). The vast 
majority of this surplus has been attributed to offsets from international climate projects (Öko-
Institut, 2013). These offsets are supposed to enable companies to exploit cheap emission 
reduction potentials outside the European Union, thereby simultaneously facilitating 
technology transfer and stimulating economic growth abroad. Yet, as numerous dubious 
projects were supported in the past, since 2013, the amount of offsets was limited for each EU 
Member State to half of the emissions to be reduced between 2008 and 2020. 
These measures, as well as postponing the auctioning of 900 million allowances from 
2014-2016 to 2019 and 2020, however, did not lead to a reduction of the surplus and, hence, 
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the rise in allowance prices was commensurately low. Therefore, the European Commission 
recently decided to introduce a market stability reserve (MSR), a rule-based mechanism to 
steering the market volume of allowances with which it is hoped to stabilize allowance prices 
at a substantially higher level than currently observed. From the Commission’s MSR 
proposal, though, significant price increases cannot be expected in the short run, most notably 
due to the foreseen late introduction in 2019. In addition, there are more general doubts about 
the effectiveness of this instrument: Koch et al. (2014:683), for instance, criticize that the 
MSR is principally ineffective in establishing a politically desired price level because of the 
low impact of demand shocks on the allowance prices.  
Based on our reflections in this article, we alternatively recommend retaining the 
trading scheme in its pure form, instead of supplementing it by a price floor or a MSR. Past 
mistakes, above all the generous issuing of offsets resulting from dubious international 
climate protection projects, should be corrected by a single intervention: deleting, rather than 
backloading, the 900 million allowances that are planned to be brought back to the market in 
2019 and 2020. Irrevocably deleting this amount of allowances will certainly have stronger 
consequences than temporally storing them in a MSR. Moreover, if it is politically desired to 
further stabilize the price, the emissions cap could be reduced more strongly (Keohane, 
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